This paper dissects the ways in which policy regime risks influence decisions over innovative energy technology investments. We apply compound real options methodology to evaluate the investment in a virtual power plant platform and distributed energy resource (DER) assets in view of volatile electricity market prices and an uncertain future electricity market design. The analysis reveals two aspects of policy regime risks: a policy content effect relating to actual market dynamics resulting from a (new) policy regime, and a policy process effect relating to (uncertainty about) the speed and probability of a regime change. The paper underlines the importance of predictable policymaking to stimulate risky investment. It further details the need to account for technology-specific investment responses to different policy regimes and risks, caused by different degrees of market versus subsidy exposure and differences between platform versus non-platform technologies.
Introduction
This paper addresses the effects of policy regime risks in interaction with wholesale market dynamics on investments in innovative energy technology. It is motivated by two observations. First, there is an ongoing debate about power market design reforms in numerous countries, with potentially drastic implications for the economic attractiveness of different energy technologies (see various contributions to this special issue of The Energy Journal). Second, there is a gap between required and actual investment levels with respect to innovative technologies and business models for low-carbon, smart energy infrastructure. We seek to contribute to a better understanding of this subject matter.
The current annual investments in clean energy technology are far from sufficient to attain climate policy goals; globally, they have to double by 2020 and to multiply sixfold until 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2014) . Today, in many countries investment activity in innovative energy technology is tightly coupled to subsidies aimed at fueling their market diffusion.
Most notably, global installed capacities of the widely subsidized photovoltaic (PV) and wind power technologies have soared to about 180 GW and 370 GW by , respectively (Global Wind Eenergy Council, 2015 Masson et al., 2014) . In Germany, these two sources alone account for about 16% of electricity consumption (Nieder et al., 2015) . While this still ranges far from the envisaged market shares in the medium-to longer term, less subsidized technologies have fared much worse. Perhaps most notably, virtual power plants (VPP) are far from fully leveraged, despite the importance assigned to them for the further integration of DER into power markets 1 . VPPs connect and coordinate geographically dispersed DER to operate them as an integrated power plant (Asmus, 2010) . This is done based on information and communication technology (ICT), including a control center and remote communication devices, in combination with steering, optimization, trading and back office processes. VPPs increase the transparency over available DER capacities, enable higher efficiency in DER operations and support system stability in view of intermittent renewable energy supply. There is thus widespread agreement that VPPs will be essential to integrate the increasing DER capacities into power markets and leverage their full value potential (Wille-Haussmann et al., 2010; Kok, 2009; You et al., 2009; Pudjianto et al., 2007) . Nevertheless, recent estimates indicate that only 5 GW, or less than 1%, of DER are aggregated and optimized within VPPs (Martin, 2014) . The importance of the technology to support energy system transformation is thus not reflected in its current market penetration.
A simple explanation might be the challenge of low profitability in wholesale power markets. In recent years, liberalization and the presence of increasing amounts of renewable energy 1 Note that we use the term "DER" to refer to actual DER assets, such as a wind or PV power plant.
have put considerable pressure on day-ahead spot market prices (e.g. Hirth, 2013) . Further, we know from investment theory that market uncertainties, i.e. volatile fuel and electricity prices and other stochastic market-related processes, might lead to investment delays (e.g. Cox et al., 1979) . But beyond that, policy regime risk is frequently cited in the energy economics literature as a reason for investment gaps (e.g. Fan et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2008; Jun and Yan, 2004; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994) . Moreover, it is considered as the key investment barrier by virtually all top managers of leading utilities in countries affected by clean energy expansion targets. In 2013, the CEOs of 8 major European utilities 2 drafted a letter to the European Council, calling for more political stability regarding power market design to support investments in promising new energy technologies (Wetzel, 2013) . Strikingly, the ways in which policy regime risk interacts with and influences innovative energy technology investments have not been dissected in much detail to date. Given the supposed relevance of the issue, we consider several (to our knowledge) unanswered questions worth addressing. Namely, is the effect of policy regime risk primarily driven by actual differences between policy designs and the impact on power market dynamics, i.e. a policy content effect? Or is it determined by (uncertainty about) the process of change, i.e. the speed and probability, i.e. a policy process effect? Do policy regime change and uncertainty affect different innovative energy technologies differently? How do investment levels for (partly) subsidized technologies respond to regime change and uncertainty, as opposed to non-subsidized technologies? Ultimately, what should policymakers do about the issue?
In the following, we attempt to add to the existing literature by looking at policy regime risk from a micro-level perspective. We observe the strategy of a risk-neutral, rational investor under different conditions of policy regimes and related uncertainty. Our focus is on the implications of different policy conditions on his investment valuation and timing. In this context, the notion of policy regime risks is scrutinized beyond the existing literature, by distinguishing between content and process. The investments considered are a VPP platform and DER assets that could potentially be operated more effectively within a VPP. We will explicitly discuss the different responses to policy regime risk between technologies, depending on value pools and degrees of subsidization of technologies. Our aim is to ultimately be able to draw conclusions for policymakers on how to dampen negative investment repercussions of policy regime changes and related uncertainty in a differentiated way. Further, we want to offer a better understanding of how VPPs may eventually create additional value in their role as a platform technology, or rather some additional capability to do business.
As an instrument for investigation, we develop a valuation framework that extends from the traditional discrete time real options (RO) methodology (Cox et al., 1979) . The framework formalizes the opportunity to build a VPP by first investing in a platform, and second integrating DER assets 3 . The sequential nature of these investment steps is incorporated through a compound approach following the principles of Majd and Pindyck (1987) . Here, each step is considered as a discrete investment step, which unlocks access to the option to enact the following investment step. Further, we incorporate market prices and subsidies as drivers of cash flows as correlated stochastic processes. Correlation is included by applying the multinomial approach from Rohlfs and Madlener (2014) , but with standard as well as alternative stochastic processes (e.g., Alexander et al., 2012) . We have first applied this approach in a different context -balancing forecast errors -in .
Policy regime risk is introduced through market design alternatives and corresponding probabilities of design change; if change occurs, (stochastic) market parameters are being structurally overhauled. The probability of regime change occurrence is modeled by means of a binomial process picking up elements from Poisson processes. This approach is distinct from works in which policy regime risk presents a (further) stochastic process similar to prices. For instance, Yang et al. (2008) model uncertain climate policy effects on energy asset investments by including a volatile carbon price. Effects of climate policy on other market parameters or possible correlations are not modeled. Jun and Yan (2004) investigate empirical electricity generation investment data for the U.S. between 1996 and 2000. They find evidence for an impact of regulatory uncertainty on investment levels. They suggest that an option value exists due to regulatory uncertainty, i.e. that regulatory uncertainty increases the value of delaying investments relative to investing immediately. Interestingly, they find it difficult to separate the 3 Note that we account for the possibility to invest in and operate a DER outside a VPP wherever suitable. effect of actual uncertainty about a regulatory change process (resembling our policy process effect) from the effects of the market design changes resulting from policy change (resembling our policy content effect).
Our paper proceeds as follows. We formulate the model in section 2. In section 3, we apply the model to the German market, including information retrieved from actual players. In section 4, we discuss the implications of the model and its application for energy policymakers and investors in innovative energy technology before we conclude.
Investment valuation model
Assume a risk-neutral, rational actor interested in entering the DER market. His desire is to profitably operate some DER (e.g., wind power plants, PV power plants, biogas power plants, flexible loads) in some value pools (e.g., wholesale power markets, subsidy schemes, balancing market). Some DER can be operated in some value pools in an isolated manner without a VPP platform. For instance, building a local wind power plant and marketing the production either through a feed-in tariff or simple direct marketing does not require a sophisticated operation and optimization infrastructure. On the other hand, the capacity or production of some DER can only be placed in certain markets if operated through a VPP platform. In general, this applies whenever some form of asset pooling and/or coordinated dispatching based on optimization algorithms is needed. Examples would be the placement of biogas power plant capacities in electricity reserve markets, or the pooling of forecast errors from geographically dispersed wind / PV power plants before balancing them in the market. If an actor is keen on maximizing value from DER by pooling them, optimizing their operation and bringing them to all possible markets, he has to take two sequential investment steps: first, develop a VPP platform to operate (aggregate, monitor and manipulate) DER assets; second, integrate the desired DER asset capacities. In our model, the timing of the investments (platform and DER assets) is flexible, but can occur no earlier than t = 1 and no later than T .
Modeling market and policy regime uncertainties
The driver of complexity in this scenario is the presence of uncertainties and risks. On the one hand, the development of prices, subsidies and related market processes is uncertain within a given policy regime. We refer to these stochastic market processes as market uncertainties. On the other hand, the policy regime may change altogether, defined as policy regime risk. Regarding policy regime risk, we distinguish between a policy content effect and a policy process effect. The former determines the extent to which investment valuations are affected by differences in market uncertainties between regimes. In other words, in how far are the assets' valuations influenced by the expected market uncertainties in the anticipated future regime?
The latter determines to which extent the uncertainty about the procedure of regime change itself influences the valuations. In other words, is the policy content effect moderated or complemented by a process effect, which alters the optimal investment strategy under policy regime uncertainty?
To deal with market uncertainties, the actor must understand which market dimensions behave stochastically. Then, he can define the matching process types and parameters. For instance, in typical (real) options models, stochastically behaving prices are defined as Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) processes of the form
where α represents the drift, σ describes process volatility, and dZ P is the increment of a Wiener process. Between any two time steps, prices can either go up or down, based on the volatility element. Possible correlation between any two processes can then be modeled by ensuring correlation in their Wiener processes. In order to be able to handle multiple correlated processes and process types 4 , we apply an adapted version of the approach introduced by Rohlfs and Madlener (2014) recently published in . The principles are in line with classical discrete-time options methodology (Cox et al., 1979) .
To deal with policy regime risks, however, a different methodology is required. This de-viation in treatment is grounded in the fact that a change in policy regime affects all or at least many market uncertainties profoundly; it may change their drift and volatility parameters, possibly even the correlation between processes 5 . Hence, we suggest a binomial approach, in which at any time step t the current regime either persists or a switch to a different regime state g (with different implications on the market uncertainties) occurs. The risk of policy regime switches is derived by means of an expression extending from Poisson processes, with the expected switching rate defined as λ . The probability that a switch to any specific regime g {g = 1, . . . , G} occurs at any time is given by
The numerator expresses the probability of an occurrence of a regime change 6 . The denominator divides this probability by the number of possible regimes that may occur. It is thereby assumed that all alternative regimes are equally likely. Notice that, in this general form, the probability of a switch is independent of the specific time. Note further that eq. (2) is a key determinant for a potential policy process effect.
Based on these definitions, we anticipate that policy regime risks affect our valuations through a policy content effect and through a policy process effect. The former is grounded in the difference between market uncertainties in the current and the expected future regime.
The more profoundly the future regime is expected to change the parameters of market uncertainties, the more policy regime risks should alter investment valuation. The latter effect is grounded in a lack of transparency about the change process. As the investor can only anticipate the probability and speed of change through his expected λ , he has to cope with additional uncertainty. This could affect his investment strategy.
Prior to any evaluations or even numerical analyses, a few interesting insights can already be derived from the nature of the uncertainties as defined. First, every additional market uncertainty doubles the range of possible market developments between two time periods. Since 5 Indeed, these altercations of process parameters is the basis for the policy content effect. 6 In a Poisson logic, the probability of no change would be expressed as
, leading to e −λ . Note that we are simplifying the Poisson logic by assuming either no change or one change as binomial alternatives, whereas in a true Poisson process, two or more changes would have to be considered as well (albeit with extremely low probability). every market uncertainty n is expressed in terms of a process moving in either up or down increments, the range of paths the market may take, given its current parameters, equals 2 n . This implies a doubling of path alternatives with every additional n and a correspondingly wider range of outcomes. Second, every additional policy regime scenario increases the range of possible market developments by T n . This is based on the fact that, within any policy regime, a market may develop into one of T n states until T ; thus, adding a scenario leads to the addition of just as many alternative states. However, the relevance of any additional scenario is tightly coupled to its probability of occurrence, given by p g . Further, the degree to which an additional scenario impacts the investment decision should also depend on the degree of differences in parameters between scenarios. Third, increasing the length of the period of uncertainty by augmenting T by 1 increases the number of possible developments by T n − (T − 1) n , implying a wider range as well. The longer the period of uncertainty already is, the greater the impact of further prolongation in terms of the number of possible outcomes.
Evaluating DER assets
As is common with sequential, or compound, real options valuation approaches, our analysis begins with the last rather than with the first investment step (Majd and Pindyck, 1987) . Hence, we need to first investigate the opportunity to operate various DER assets, assuming that a VPP platform is already in place.
The investor is keen on acquiring a portfolio of different DER. Both type and capacity of any DER asset investment are specified by x = 1, . . . , X. The assets enable the investor to generate operating profits in various value pools m = 1, . . . , M. Four elements determine the extent of operating profits per x: the time of market entry t * , the revenue per unit of asset capacity in any specific value pool, R(t * ) x m , the share of asset capacity devoted to that value pool φ x m , and the operating and maintenance (O&M) costs C x . This yields the total operating profit per asset capacity x,
Eq. (3) shows that the share of asset capacity operated in a particular market is limited by the free market share in a value pool at t * , η(t * ) m . Usually, we expect η(t) m to decline over time, as first movers have less competition and can establish themselves more easily. In that case, η(t) m should stimulate earlier investments by reducing the market share available upon late entry. This effect is similar to a shortening of the investment period T , since the final periods become unattractive as investment periods. However, it may also be inferred that the market grows over time and that later entrants can benefit from providing more advanced services (2nd-mover advantages). Hence, η(t) m may also grow. This should induce further postponement.
Note that market uncertainties influence the calculation of S(t * ) x , through revenues R(t * ) m .
As R(t * ) m is dependent on the start time of operations t * , the price dynamics between t = 1 and t * affect the achievable revenue. Again, these price dynamics are a result of the market uncertainties as defined earlier, which in turn are a direct result of the policy content effect of any given policy regime. Moreover, the revenue R(t * ) m is not a single static value, but rather the sum of yearly revenues r(t) m over the lifetime A of the asset, i.e.
R(t
Thus, the price dynamics after entry t * also affect overall revenues obtained. This also implies that possible policy regime changes after market entry could shake up the revenues obtained over the asset's lifetime, meaning that both market uncertainties and possible policy process as well as content effects need to be accounted for when deriving R(t * ) m 7 . Strictly speaking, as these values are subject to uncertainty, they constitute expected rather than definite values. In order to keep notation simple, we assume this to be a common understanding without further highlighting.
Prior to operating DER assets and obtaining S(t * ) x , the DERs need to be built or acquired;
in other words, an investment might be necessary. To evaluate the investment, one could very simply deduct the expected investment costs I x from the total expected operating profit per 7 The exact equation to derive R(t * ) m depends on the respective value pool. For instance, if m refers to offering balancing power in the balancing market, revenue is determined by the fees paid for providing both capacity and, if activated, power. When m describes day-ahead sales of PV or wind power, revenues are subject to subsidies. As subsidies are typically guaranteed once the investment has materialized, they are much less affected by market uncertainties and policy content effects after t * .
asset. However, we refer to a setting in which uncertainty exists and in which the investor has the freedom to postpone the investment decision until T . This calls for real options valuation, where the alternative to delay investments into the next period t + 1 is incorporated as well:
Here, the value of the investment opportunity on asset x equals the higher value of either investing now (S(t) x − I x ) or postponing the investment decision (
, discounted for the time-value-of-money effect through τ, due to the delay of cash flows.
The option valuation is only indirectly affected by policy content effects through S(t) x for the current and all following periods until T 8 . However, policy regime uncertainty impacts the option valuation directly through the policy process effect. More specifically, the postponement value O(t + 1) x needs to account for the fact that the policy regime may or may not switch between t and t + 1. The probability of such a switch is determined by the switching rate λ and the time progressed so far. This increases the volatility of possible outcomes when delaying investment; it thus constitutes a process effect separate from any content details about the anticipated regime change.
Evaluating the VPP platform
Some DER can only be operated in some value pools if aggregated and dispatched with an optimization and trading infrastructure in the background -i.e. a VPP platform. Building a VPP platform provides the investor with additional options on DER and value pool accesses. Simply put, the present value of platform operation equals the difference between the aggregated value of all additional DER asset options available owing to the VPP X * {X}, and the O&M costs of running the platform,
As the value of the platform entirely depends on the option values of the DER assets, it is fully exposed to the effects that market and policy regime risks have on DER option valuation. However, we would expect a diversification effect from the fact that the platform can tap multiple DERs and value pools which are exposed differently to different market uncertainties and thus also policy regime uncertainty effects.
Turning towards the initial platform investment, a logic similar to the DER asset investment principle depicted in eq. (7) applies. Specifically, we derive an option value which equals the higher value of either investing in the platform immediately or postponing the decision into the next period, t + 1. However, a lead time L F may apply that accounts for the delays often associated with ICT investment and development projects (Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza, 2003) . This yields
where τ describes the rate applied to discount the time-value-of-money effect stemming from either the delay between investment and operation of F, or from the postponement of the investment decision.
As can be seen from the left-hand term within squared brackets in eq. (7), ICT development lead time does have an exponential, detrimental impact on the investment value through the discount factor. Further, in the case of policy regime uncertainty, we can expect lead time to amplify the policy process effect. The more time elapses between the decision of market entry and actual entry, the less certainty we have about the policy regime at the time of entry.
Numerical application
In the following, the previously developed model will be applied to an investment case. The impact of (variations in) different policy regimes, and related risks, will be measured and compared to some of the analytical intuitions derived earlier. Further, the responses of different technologies to different uncertainty dynamics will be looked at.
Problem setting
We evaluate the opportunity to invest in the development of a VPP for operation in German wholesale power markets. An investment period of 8 years (T = 8) is assumed, after which market entry is no longer considered possible 9 . Market uncertainties are present. In some scenarios, the policy regime is uncertain, too. More specifically, it is expected that a shift of market design from the base case regime g 0 to another regime g will be enacted within the investment period. In these scenarios, we set the probability of a switch in regimes to λ = 1/T ; this implies that the investor expects the frequency in policy regime changes to be such that one change will occur until T . For the sake of simplicity and tractability, we exclude the possibility of more than one policy regime switch, i.e., at any time t, we set
Based on expert discussions, existing marketing opportunities, and the intent to reasonably scope our analysis, we focus on two value pools: (1) direct marketing of renewable electricity;
and (2) marketing of dispatchable capacities and power in the (secondary) balancing market.
With respect to (1), we separate between value drivers obtainable without a VPP platform (= subsidized day-ahead direct marketing 10 ) and VPP-related value drivers (i.e., forecast error pooling and netting when conducting direct marketing). Regarding (2), we assume that operating DER in balancing markets always requires a VPP platform.
Referring to DER technologies, we limit our analysis to some of the most widespread DER with a track record of financial viability: wind onshore power and biogas power plants. Wind power plants are only considered for direct marketing and biogas power plants are purely considered for capacity marketing 11 . Including other DER, such as PV or small combined heat 9 The period is set to 8 years in order to provide a reasonable trade-off between robustness in results and computational tractability. Overall, we consider 8 years to be a reasonable "strategic" time horizon for investment decisions. Other period settings are possible and have been tested to validate the choice made. Extending the period leads to higher relative option values for the VPP platform, but does not yield any significantly different results. 10 We account for the given subsidy regulation as defined in the 2014 amendment to the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). An important assumption made in the model is that the subsidy level is locked-in once the investment has been committed.
11 Note that we leave out direct marketing of biogas power plants, since it would not provide any additional Figure 1 : Overview of considered DER and value pools in the simulation (a more detailed description of value pool logics and parameters is provided in table 4 in the appendix).
and power units, would be possible, but at little additional value for the analysis of market and policy regime uncertainty effects. Figure 1 provides an overview of the interaction between value pools, markets, and value drivers.
Finally, regarding the VPP platform, we consider it to be able to operate all the DER mentioned in the day-ahead, intraday, and balancing markets. We estimate initial development costs at e 1,000,000 and yearly O&M costs at about e 1,020,000 (10 full-time equivalent employees at e 100,000 and other operating costs for the control room at e 20,000). Table 1 lists the DER considered in our analysis and the VPP platform with the respective parameters.
Next, one needs to identify the market uncertainties. In our case, we find six relevant stochastic processes: the subsidy level for day-ahead direct marketing, the intraday price level, They are assumed to have been born before. The offering of biogas power plant capacity in the balancing market alluded to here constitutes an additional investment-free value pool, made available when connecting an existing biogas power plant to a VPP platform.
insight. Likewise, we ignore the option to offer negative balancing capacity through wind power plants.
the imbalance price level, the secondary balancing capacity remuneration, and the secondary balancing power activation remuneration.
The subsidy level has a substantial impact on the value obtained from producing renewable electricity. The German regulator subsidizes the sale of power from renewable energy sources in the day-ahead market to match a guaranteed feed-in-tariff level (direct marketing). This level is technology-specific, but subject to similar dynamics across technologies. For instance, the support for direct marketing of power from wind onshore and biogas power plants differs in absolute terms, but the planned reduction of tariff levels in the coming years is almost equal in relative terms 12 . Also, volatility is low, since the subsidy level can only be affected by policy regime changes, and not by market dynamics within a given regime.
The intraday price impacts DER valuations as well. Namely, the level of the intraday price relative to the imbalance price alters the value that VPPs can create for the marketing of wind (and PV) power production. Assuming intraday prices to fare below imbalance fees, VPP operators can reduce balancing costs by compensating (a share of their) unforeseen supply deficits or surpluses in the intraday rather than in the imbalance market 13 . Overall, the intraday price is subject to considerable volatility. One reason is the still-limited volatility in intraday markets Hagemann and Weber, 2013; Weber, 2010) . It should be noted, however, that liquidity generally increases and therewith drives down absolute price levels as well. Another reason for volatility are the hardly foreseeable dynamics of PV and wind power production forecast errors, which are a driver of intraday trading (von Selasinsky, 2014; Hagemann and Weber, 2013) . The imbalance price is subject to uncertainty as well, but we consider its volatility to fare below the volatility of intraday prices. This assumption is grounded in the imbalance price's more regulated price determination process (managed by transmission system operators, TSOs).
Finally, balancing market compensation mechanisms deserve some discussion at this point.
Operators of (dispatchable) power plant capacities can offer their capacity as a backup, for temporarily ramping either down (negative) or up (positive) supply or, vice-versa, loads in case the TSOs demand it. In return, they receive a remuneration for capacity provision and power 12 Roughly 2% annual reduction according to the 2014 EEG. 13 This is hardly possible for small operators outside of VPPs, since they lack the required trading capabilities.
activation (if needed). We consider both the provision of capacity and of power to be subject to the same dynamics. Further, since the contracted capacity is the basis for imbalance fees to be paid when incurring them, the correlation between capacity remuneration and imbalance fees is likely high. Prices are volatile, but less volatile than intraday prices due to the more regulated nature of price formation. Further, we expect prices (for secondary negative capacity provision) to decline slightly, in line with the trend of previous years and driven by ever more capacity being offered in the capacity market (Balance Power GmbH, 2014) .
Having discussed market uncertainties, we now turn to policy regime risks. The policy regime base case represents the current state of affairs, i.e. market uncertainties behave according to established dynamics. In line with the discussions around possible market design changes in Germany spurred by politicians, scientists, and managers 14 , we consider two alternative states. On the one hand, we consider a free market world, in which the markets are highly deregulated. Challenges, such as the integration of more renewable electricity and the assurance of sufficient back-up capacity are left entirely up to price formation and the markets.
On the other hand, we consider a more tightly regulated world. Here, price formation is subject to political guidance and volatility in price processes is curbed. Table 2 summarizes the market uncertainty parameters for each of the considered policy regime states. a All start values P 0 are estimates derived from 2013 and 2014 data. The Intraday price is derived from EPEX data for Germany in 2013, the imbalance and balancing market prices (capacity and power) are derived from 2014 data across the 4 German TSOs. The initial subsidy level an drift is based on 2014 renewable energy regulation in Germany. All volatilities are estimated based on expert discussions and insights previously generated in . b The subsidy factor is the only volatile process modeled as an ABM. All other processes are modeled as GBM processes. In order to test the impact of different policy regimes (and risks) on investment value and timing, we construct several scenarios. In scenarios 1 to 3, a specific policy regime is fixed and sure to remain. The individual scenarios then represent the base case, the free market world, and the regulated world, respectively. In scenarios 4 and 5, the base case regime is the starting point, with uncertainty about a switch to either the free market world (scenario 4) oder the regulated world (scenario 5). In scenario 6, the base case is again the starting point. However, this time the investor anticipates a regime switch without knowing whether the switch will introduce the free market world or the regulated world. Figure 2 provides an overview of the considered scenarios.
Results
Across our investigations, to abstract from other influences, we hold all parameters constant except for the policy regime with the corresponding market uncertainties (stochastic processes).
This implies constant start parameters at t = 1 (initial prices, subsidies, spreads), a fixed riskfree discount rate of 4%, the investigated time period from t = {1, . . . , T = 8}, the assets' depreciation period of A = 16 years, and the capital costs being set to 8%. Table 2 lists all parameters related to the stochastic processes used and the values they take on in the different policy regimes investigated. Rather than overemphasizing quantitative results, which would imply significant exposure to the chosen parametrization, the analysis focuses on understanding the interaction between parameters and values across scenarios in qualitative terms.
In scenario 1 (base case without policy regime uncertainty), the platform as well as the wind power plant investment have positive NPVs and are immediately executed. Indeed, the wind power plant NPV for immediate investment exceeds the option value of postponing the investment decision by a factor of 2.6. The reason is that obtainable subsidies are expected to decline; meanwhile, once the investment is locked in, subsidies are fixed and guaranteed. Thus, early execution is much more lucrative than delay. Regarding the VPP platform investment, the outcome is less clear. First, the option value of postponement almost reaches the NPV of immediate execution NPV (ratio of just under 95%). This is grounded in the fact that the platform value depends on the option values of market-related rather than subsidy-related value pools and is thus subject to more volatility than the wind power plant investment. Under such uncertainty, postponing the decision becomes more valuable. Interestingly, though, the ratio between option value and NPV of the platform is lower than the same ratios for the underlying value pools (i.e. placing of biogas power plants in the balancing market and pooling as well as netting effects for wind power marketing). There appears to be some diversification effect between the different underlying value pools, as they depend on different stochastic market parameters. Indeed, the lower relative option value indicates that the platform is exposed to less uncertainty relative to its NPV than the individual underlying DER value pools.
In scenario 2 (free market world without policy regime uncertainty), both investments again have positive NPVs. However, only the wind power plant investment is immediately executed -the immediate NPV exceeds the option value by a factor greater than 10. The reason is that subsidies are expected to decline even more steeply than in the base case, implying a further reduced value of postponement. Contrary to that, the VPP platform investment is indeed postponed, as the option value slightly exceeds the immediate NPV. Maybe more interestingly, the ratio between option value and NPV of the platform is higher than the same ratio for the underlying value pools in scenario 2. The reasons may be that the stochastic processes of the underlying market parameters are less heterogeneous and more volatile than in the base case (where there was a diversification effect). Instead of a diversification effect, the similarly structured and volatile processes of the underlying value pools appear to reinforce the value obtainable from postponing the VPP platform investment.
Scenario 3 (regulated market without policy regime uncertainty) invokes yet different results. Within this regime, the wind power plant investment is nearly postponed (option value at 96% of the immediate NPV). The reason is that the subsidy level is expected to remain constant with nearly no volatility. Postponing does not yield any additional benefits, neither does it lead to any value losses -except for a time discount on the present value. The platform investment is immediately executed, albeit with a lower NPV than in any other scenario -the NPV is less than half as high as in the free market world. The reason is that lower volatility and fewer upsides make both the investment generally, and the postponed investment in particular, less attractive. Similarly to the base case, a diversification effect can be observed, implying that a postponement of the platform investment is less attractive than the postponement of accessing the underlying value pools.
A couple of findings are worth mentioning with respect to scenarios 4 to 6, in which policy regime uncertainty is assumed. In scenario 4, it is assumed that the base case regime (as in scenario 1) will eventually be replaced by the free market (as in scenario 2), but with uncertain given the lock-in effect due to the subsidy, an anticipated policy regime in the future affects the current investment decision much less than it does in the case of the VPP platform. A similar observation can be made for scenario 5. Here, it is assumed that the base case regime (as in scenario 1) will eventually be replaced by the regulated market (as in scenario 3). Again, values lie between scenarios 1 and 3; the values for the VPP platform account much more strongly for the effects of the anticipated regulated regime than do the values for the wind power plant. In scenario 6, a regime shift from the base case (as in scenario 1) to either the free market world or the regulated world is anticipated, with equal probability of occurrence. For the VPP platform, both the NPV and the option values are the exact averages between scenarios 4 and 5. For the wind power plant, the option value is slightly below the average of the values of scenarios 4 and 5. 
Discussion and conclusion
Both the model development and the application to the investment opportunity for a VPP in Germany offer interesting new insights. We can observe both a policy content as well as a policy process effect. Both the anticipated content as well as the assumptions about the process of policy regime change influence rational investment decisions. The impacts could be separately quantified in our approach.
The content effect becomes obvious in scenarios 1 to 3. More specifically, the value of investing in a VPP platform as a market-dependent technology is strongly affected by the contents of the given policy regime. For instance, the high volatility and expected increases of underlying stochastic parameters in the free market world induce a particularly high NPV for the platform. Meanwhile, they also lead to investment postponement, since volatility is high and further upsides are anticipated. The implication is that investments in technologies whose value depends on market rather than subsidy developments are postponed whenever the current or anticipated market design implies great volatility -be it for reasons of a higher expected profit or due to the risk of unfavorable market developments. In other words, the often called-for free market design may not always be the energy technology investment catalyst it is believed to be.
The more volatile market prices are expected to be, the more postponement can be expected regarding non-subsidized technologies.
Maybe even more strikingly, our analysis shows that investment decisions regarding (partly) subsidized technologies are more likely to be postponed under regimes with stable subsidies than in regimes with declining subsidies (scenario 3 versus scenarios 1, 2). As a consequence for policymakers, regressing subsidy schemes might turn out to be more effective after all:
they stimulate investment front-loading, which may speed up technological learning curves and thereby reduce future investment costs; eventually, less subsidies might be necessary to spur investment in the future. All in all, the treatment of (partly) subsidized innovative energy technologies requires caution.
Next to the policy content effect, we could identify the policy process effect as a further effect on rational investment decisions. Namely, the degree to which NPV and option value are affected by anticipated changes in market design is strongly influenced by expectations about timing. The assumptions that investors make about the speed of change affects their expected values significantly. Again, a differentiation is required regarding subsidized technologies; in case a lock-in effect is present and the expected NPV is positive (as for wind power plants in our analysis), anticipations about future regime changes do not matter, Obviously, this finding rests on the assumption that future regime changes do not reverse any lock-in effects.
A limitation of our exploratory work, particularly with respect to the policy process effect, is that we focused on a rational investor, a pre-condition of the real options methodology used.
In reality, investors tend to not act perfectly rationally. This certainly applies to instances of policy regime uncertainty. Some of the optimal strategies identified in this research are counterintuitive. Since not all managers, and certainly not the public, rely on these or similar analysis approaches, more intuitive choices might be made. Further, especially the policy process effect depends heavily on assumptions about type and time of change. This points us to the critical role of sound policymaking: the more transparency and the less ambiguity regarding regime changes policymakers ensure, the more informed the decisions of investors will be. Conse-quentially, if more investment is to be stimulated, the process of policy regime amendments matters just as the actual content does.
Finally, the analysis revealed some particularities referring to VPP platform investments.
On the one hand, VPP platforms present an innovative energy technology with great exposure to markets and ultimately policy regime risks which (may) influence market parameters. This stands in contrast to heavily subsidized innovative energy technologies, like wind power plants, which have fared much better regarding investment levels so far, partly because they were not burdened with the external costs they incur. The results of our numerical example confirm that, indeed, market exposure and policy regime risks may be a reason that potential investors have preferred to postpone VPP investments. On the other hand, VPP platform investments are not exposed to the commercial success of any individual business model. Rather, they can be understood as a claim on various DER and value pool options, implying a valuable diversification in the presence of policy regime risks. In our example, we have only touched upon a fraction of the value pools a VPP platform could provide access to. For instance, further value pools could be demand response with flexible loads or storage or negative balancing capacity offered by wind or PV power plants. As a consequence, it could be that potential investors underestimate some of the (long-term) value potential of VPP platforms owing to the platform role of VPP technology with access to a number of value pools.
This, in turn, implies that VPP platform development may better be interpreted as a capability development (capacity building for new business, or doing business in new ways) rather than a one-off investment. The ability to efficiently operate different kinds of DER in different kinds of markets or value pools could then be seen as a capability at the core of utility business in a world of ever-increasing shares of DER. The implication would be that, with respect to VPP platform development, high flexibility to accommodate many DER and access many value pools would become a key success factor. Future research could shed further light on this aspect by more deeply investigating the value of platform flexibility when operating DER business models. Savings in forecast error balancing costs obtainable from using VPP to trade errors also in the intraday market rather than only in the imbalance market (only for wind) Estimated based on spread between intraday and imbalance prices, for 20% of the assumed forecast error of offered volumes (10%) Capacity remuneration
Compensation for the provision of negative capacity in the secondary balancing market Estimated at 35,000e p.a.
Power activation remuneration
Compensation for the activation of negative power in the secondary balancing market Estimated at 100e /MWh for about 250 hours p.a.
